PROCESS THOUGHT Edited by Nicholas Rescher • Johanna Seibt • Michel Weber Advisory Board Mark Bickhard • Jaime Nubiola • Roberto Poli Volume 14 ...

At the beginning of his magnum opus, Process and Reality (1929), Whitehead lists a series of beliefs which he thinks are widely held by contemporary philosophers. They are all condemned as dangerously mistaken. What are these myths? Why are they rejected? In the works of which modern thinker did they arise? What precisely went wrong? At what stage in the development of Western thought did this happen? By tackling these questions, Pierfrancesco Basile makes it possible to grasp the (...) main concepts of Whitehead's process metaphysics - especially the crucial notion that being and power are one and the same - and appreciate the complex way this is rooted in the modern philosophical tradition. (shrink)

Although panpsychism has had a very long history, one that goes back to the very origin of western philosophy, its force has only recently been appreciated by analytic philosophers of mind. And even if many still reject the theory as utterly absurd, others have argued that it is the only genuine form of physicalism. This paper examines the case for panpsychism and argues that there are at least goodprima faciereasons for taking it seriously. In a second step, the paper discusses (...) the main difficulty the theory has to face, the ‘composition problem’. This is the problem of explaining how the primitive experiences that are supposed to exist at the ultimate level of reality could give rise to the unified experience of a human being. What assumptions as to the nature of experience generate the composition problem? Is mental composition impossible in principle or do we simply lack at present any understanding of phenomenal parts and wholes? (shrink)

Bradley believes that the metaphysician’s dream of contemplating reality sub specie aeternitatis cannot be fulfilled. The theory of thought put forward in The Principles of Logic provides him with a basis for arguing that human understanding is inadequate to the task of grasping the ultimate truth about what there is. His position is far from being a sceptical one, however, and he argues that we can rise up to an imperfect knowledge of the nature of reality. ‘I am so bold (...) as to believe that we have knowledge of the Absolute, certain and real, though I am sure that our comprehension is miserably incomplete’. Among the most important things we know, are the following. They are all centred upon the distinction between appearance and reality. (shrink)

This paper provides a brief critique of Jaegwon Kim’s evaluation of the achievements of materialist physicalism and then goes on to examine the case for panpsychism and the main objection that has been raised against it, i.e., the composition problem. The object of this examination is to lay bare the fundamental assumptions underlying both the main argument in support of the theory and the objection against it. Whitehead’s panexperientialism has a fair claim to be regarded as the most elaborate version (...) of the theory ever produced. Once the logical structure of the composition problem has been clarified, however, it becomes possible to see that—contrary to what has been argued by David Ray Griffin in his important book, Unsnarling the World-Knot—even Whitehead’sversion of the doctrine fails to provide a satisfactory solution. The paper is brought to an end with a general reflection on the shortcomings of current critiques of panpsychism. Whitehead’s panexperientialism cannot be accepted as it stands and panpsychism as a general philosophical position is not supported by a conclusive proof; nevertheless, the notion that experience is a pervasive feature of reality has the unquestionable merit of being a wholly adequate response to a real philosophical perplexity. (shrink)

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 19, Issue 5, Page 1008-1011, September 2011.

This book introduces the reader to Whitehead’s complex and often misunderstood metaphysics by showing that it deals with questions about the nature of causation originally raised by the philosophy of Leibniz. Whitehead’s philosophy is an attempt at rehabilitating Leibniz’s theory of monads by recasting it in terms of novel ontological categories.

According to the editors of this book, “The history of philosophy as taught today is a highly selective activity. In its determination to tell a particular story, it passes over in silence large swathes of otherwise interesting philosophical work”. This claim would have been worthy of serious consideration had it been made a few decades ago—that is to say, at a time when analytic philosophy was a clearly recognizable philosophical movement. The “particular story” according to which the works of the (...) British idealists were allegedly sacrificed would then have been easily identified as the story of how the young Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore showed the absurdity involved in holding that... (shrink)

This paper provides an interpretation and evaluation of Spinoza's highly original version of the ontological proof in terms of the concept of substance instead of the concept of perfection in the first book of his Ethics. Taking the lead from Kant'€™s critique of ontological arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason, the paper explores the underlying ontological and epistemological presuppositions of Spinoza'€™s proof. The main topics of consideration are the nature of Spinoza's definitions, the way he conceives of the relation (...) between a substance and its essence, and his conception of existence. Once clarity is shed upon these fundamental issues, it becomes possible to address the proof in its own terms. It is then easy to see that Kant's objections miss their target and that the same is true of those advanced by another of the ontological argument'€™s most famous critics, Bertrand Russell. Finally, several interpretations of Spinoza'€™s proof are proposed and critically evaluated; on all of them, the argument turns out to be either invalid or question-begging. (shrink)

Russell’s critique of substance monism is an ideal starting point from which to understand some main concepts in Spinoza’s difficult metaphysics. This paper provides an in-depth examination of Spinoza’s proof that only one substance exists. On this basis, it rejects Russell’s interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of reality as founded upon the logical doctrine that all propositions consist of a predicate and a subject. An alternative interpretation is offered: Spinoza’s substance is not a bearer of properties, as Russell implied, but an (...) eternally active, self-actualizing creative power. Eventually, Spinoza the Monist and Russell the Pluralist are at one in holding that process and activity rather than enduring things are the most fundamental realities. (shrink)

What is consciousness? What is the place of consciousness in nature? These and related questions occupy a prominent place in contemporary studies in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, often involving complex interdisciplinary connections between philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, biology and cognitive neuroscience. At the same time, these questions play a fundamental role in the philosophies of great thinkers of the past such as, among others, Plotinus, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, William James and Edmund Husserl. This new collection of essays by leading (...) contemporary philosophers of mind and historians of philosophy seeks to address these questions from both a systematic and a theoretical perspective and to create a new and fruitful forum for future discussion. In the attempt to do justice to the richness of our mental life, the volume features in-depth examinations not solely of mainstream physicalist doctrines, but also of largely neglected positions such as Cartesian dualism, idealism and panpsychism. (shrink)

Whitehead and Dewey called for a deep reform of philosophy. Although they respected one another, Dewey can be read as criticizing Whitehead for his adherence to a traditional, and unfortunately conservative, way of conceiving of the discipline. This article provides an in-depth reconstruction as well as a qualified defense of Dewey’s charge.

Whitehead's system may be interpreted as a majestic attempt at recasting Leibniz's theory of monads in terms of sounder ontological categories. After a brief introductory section on the sources of Whitehead's knowledge of Leibniz's philosophy, the paper explains why Whitehead turned to Leibniz for metaphysical inspiration. Attention then shifts to Whitehead's understanding of the problems involved with Leibniz's theory of monads and his alternative explanation of monadic causation. Whitehead's endeavour to install windows in Leibniz's monads may not be entirely convincing, (...) but there are philosophical gems scattered here and there in his analyses – true moments of insight that repay close examination. (shrink)

What is consciousness? What is the place of consciousness in nature? These and related questions occupy a prominent place in contemporary studies in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, often involving complex interdisciplinary connections between philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, biology and cognitive neuroscience. At the same time, these questions play a fundamental role in the philosophies of great thinkers of the past such as, among others, Plotinus, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, William James and Edmund Husserl. This new collection of essays by leading (...) contemporary philosophers of mind and historians of philosophy seeks to address these questions from both a systematic and a theoretical perspective and to create a new and fruitful forum for future discussion. In the attempt to do justice to the richness of our mental life, the volume features in-depth examinations not solely of mainstream physicalist doctrines, but also of largely neglected positions such as Cartesian dualism, idealism and panpsychism. (shrink)

Notwithstanding these and many other differences, in Process and Reality Whitehead recognises his debt towards Bradley. He emphasises the importance of the doctrine of feeling and goes so far as to qualify his whole cosmological system as an approximation to Bradley.

It may not be easy to see what Hume, Bradley and James have in common. It is usually recognised that they are empiricist, insofar as they believed that it is experience which furnishes us with all the materials for thinking. Nonetheless, there are many other philosophers which are empiricist in this sense, and Hume is commonly referred to as a ‘sceptic’, Bradley as an ‘idealist’, and only James as a ‘radical empiricist’. Hence I need to provide some justification for putting (...) them under the same one label of ‘Radical Empiricism’. (shrink)

(2010). Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein (eds): The American Philosophers (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. XXVIII) British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 726-730.

L’article présente diverses observations faites au forum de Philippes au fil des ans, difficiles à intégrer dans une publication définitive. I. Plusieurs creusements affectent les dalles, surtout dans la partie nord-ouest du dallage : six logements pour rabattre des anneaux ayant peut-être servi aux officiels de la colonie pour attacher leur monture, et cinq trous carrés (deux sont traversants) qui pourraient avoir servi à fixer des mâts. II. Publication de 12 jeux de marelle (un seul avait déjà été illustré) dont (...) la répartition peut donner des indications sur la fréquentation réelle de la place ; en appendice, présentation succincte de 5 autres marelles (4 au marché, 1 dans la rue du Commerce). III. Fragment de cadran solaire en marbre dont le lieu d’exposition pourrait avoir été la rue du Commerce à proximité du forum. IV. Fragment d’une plaque de latrine trouvée dans un remblai, probablement antérieure au milieu du IIe s. p. C., mais dont l’emplacement d’origine ne peut être déterminé. (shrink)

Ή σειρά τῶν μνημείων,πού θεωρεῖται σήμερα σάν ἡ βόρεια πλευρά τοῦ Forum τῶν Φιλίππων, δέν ἐμποδίζει τη θέα, σέ ἀντίθεση μέ τίς τρεῖς ἄλλες πλευρές. Διατυπώνεται ἡ υπόθεση ὅτι, στις πρῶτες κλιτῦες τῆς ἀκρόπολης, πέρα ἀπό τό decumanus maximus πού ἐκτείνεται κατά μήκος — ἤ μάλλον διασχίζει — τό Forum, ὑπῆρχε μία σειρά μνημείων κτισμένων πάνω στό ἄνδηρο ὅπου ἀργότερα ἐγκαταστάθηκε ἡ βασιλική Α. Σώζονται πολλά λείψανα αὐτοκρατορικῶν χρόνων : ἡ ὑποδομή ἑνός μνημείου πού ἔγινε δεξαμενή σέ δεύτερη χρήση, μᾶλλον (...) ρωμαϊκοῦ παρά ἐλληνιστικοῦ, μνημειώδεις κλίμακες πού προηγήθηκαν τῶν παλαιοχριστιανικῶν κτισμάτων καί λίθοι, διάσπαρτοι ἤ σέ δεύτερη χρήση, πού προέρχονται τουλάχιστον ἀπό τρία διαφορετικά κτήρια, τά ὁποῖα δέν μπορεῖ νά τοποθετηθοῦν στήν κάτω πλατεία. Ἡ ἐνοποιημένη σύνθεση πού ἀποκτοῦμε ἔτσι, συνδέεται μέ ἀνάλογα οἰκοδομικά σύνολα, καί ἡ ὁδός, πεζόδρομος μᾶλλον παρά καρρόδρομος, ἐντασσόταν σ' αὐτό τό μνημειακό σύνολο χωρίς νά τό τέμνει. (shrink)

Une découverte récente permet d'interpréter un monument situé à proximité du temple Est du forum : il s'agit d'une longue base pour au moins cinq, et peut-être sept dames dont quatre avaient été prêtresses de Livie. Ce monument, mis en place à l'extrême fin du Ier s. ou au début du n* s. ap. J.-C, a curieusement été respecté lors des importants travaux exécutés au début du règne de Marc-Aurèle. Étude des dédicaces et de la base, et réflexions sur les (...) implications topographiques de cette situation. (shrink)

L’article présente deux résultats qui trouveraient mal leur place dans la publication définitive en cours d’élaboration. I. Compléments d’ordre archéologique à la publication de la dédicace du dallage CIPh II 1, 66, et proposition pour la remettre à sa place initiale. Elle était située longitudinalement au milieu de la place de façon à pouvoir être lue depuis la terrasse haute. Comme la suivante, la première phase monumentale a été aménagée aux frais des notables de la colonie. II. Publication d’une table (...) à mesure connue par une allusion et une photographie, et d’un autre fragment très mutilé. La table à mesure située face au tabularium, impossible à dater, est taillée en sous‑face pour emboîter les degrés du monument, au moins à partir du milieu du iie s. p. C. Examen des difficultés que soulève sa présence dans un espace qui n'avait plus de rôle commercial à cette époque. (shrink)

The earthquake that struck Philippi at the turn from the 5th to 6th century is only known through the reconstruction work it caused. These works were first identified on the lower terrace of the forum, particularly on the porticoes, in the curia and in the room with five columns on the west side; they made possible the identification of the third architectural state. The earthquake also destroyed or severely damaged the temples on the upper forum terrace, setting the premices for (...) the construction of Basilica A. To the south of the forum, it caused the – probably total – ruin of the palestra (apart from its latrines, which were buried sufficiently deep to be spared) and, to a lesser extent, of the market. Lastly, this earthquake was the cause of the disorders that led to the reconstruction of the Basilica of the Octagon, and probably of the “extra muros” Basilica as well. An examination of the damage caused to the curia by a construction accident, which was immediately repaired but had nothing to do with the earthquake, can be found in the appendix. (shrink)